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No Pain, No Gain:
The State of the Industry in Light of
an American Islamic Private Equity Transaction
Umar F. Moghul*
I. INTRODUCTION
Islamic finance is the recent attempt to bring into compliance with the
Divine the finances and economies of both individuals and nations. This attempt
follows from a recognition by Muslims that the assumptions, regulations, and
objectives of the conventional financial order are not wholly consistent with
their religion.' It is one of the few areas in which there is an active,
contemporary effort by Muslims and those of other faiths to implement the
tenets of the Islamic religion to the challenges of the modern world.2
Islamic financial transactions regularly take place in jurisdictions, including
Muslim majority nations as well as Europe and the US, in which Islamic law is
not the law of the land. Frequently, these transactions play an instructive role
because they represent instances of first impression in some form. These include
cases where contemporary Muslim jurists have not yet issued legal opinions, or
fatawa. Moreover, these transactions often necessitate creativity in response to
the tensions that arise from the interaction between and required compliance

I

2

Mr. Moghul is an associate at the law firm Murtha Culina LLP, where he practices in Islamic
Banking and Finance, Structured Finance, and Private Equity. Mr. Moghul is also an adjunct
faculty member at Western New England College School of Law where he teaches Islamic law.
The author uses the terms "conventional" and "modern" in this Article to refer to the currently
dominant financial and banking order. For additional discussion, see Umar F. Moghul and Arshad
Ahmed, ContractualForms in Islamic Finance Law and Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v.
Symphony Gems N.V. & Ors.: A FirstImpression of Islamic Finance, 27 Fordham Intl L J 150, 15657 (2003).
Rules of trade and finance are part and parcel of the Islamic legal system by which Muslims
conduct their lives and according to which Muslims order their finances and businesses. The rules
of Islamic finance are understood as law. See id at 157-63.
A fatwa may be understood as a legal opinion. See generally Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley
Messick, and David Powers, eds, Islamic Legal Interpretation:Muftis and TheirFatwas (Harvard 1996).
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with two or more legal systems, as well as from practical contemporary
considerations.
This Article focuses on the classical Islamic contract form of sharikab as it
is currently implemented by contemporary Islamic private equity transactions. A
number of key issues arising from a transaction, in which the author served as
counsel to an Islamic investment bank acquiring a non-controlling share in a US
company, are presented below to demonstrate the increasing ability of Islamic
finance to implement a greater portion of its substantive concepts-a point that
demonstrates the industry's successes in its initial phase. This transaction
("subject transaction") also shows the impact of Islamic principles on
conventional private equity arrangements and highlights some similarities and
differences between contemporary Islamic financial practice and classical
jurisprudence.4
II.

THE STATE OF THE INDUSTRY: SOME REFLECTIONS

A common criticism of Islamic finance relates to whether it has remained
true to classical Islamic law. Certain critics lament the absence of equity
financing structures, despite their contended parallel with the "essence" of
Islamic finance. These critics argue that Islamic laws pertaining to business
transactions and finance place a strong emphasis on profit- and loss-sharing
among transaction participants, including capital providers. In support of this
argument, various texts, including the important hadith, which states
"[Entitlement to] profit must be accompanied by a liability for loss," are often
quoted.' Proponents of this position generally find that the Islamic contract
form known as sharikah,6 a form of joint ownership often translated as
4

Readers are encouraged not to assume that if there is a difference between contemporary practice
and classical Islamic law, such a difference is inappropriate or somehow un-Islamic. It should be
noted that there are a number of important topics related to our subject matter that are beyond
the scope of this Article. For example, certain contemporary concerns, such as the use of sbarikab
as a financing mechanism and the securitization of such financings or of private equity pools
generally, are not discussed here.

5

In Arabic this statement reads: "Al-kbaraj bi al-daman." See Sunan Abu Dawud, Wages (Kitab AlIjarab) No 3501 (undated); Ibn Majah, 2 Sunan Ibn Majab 754 (Cairo: 'Isa al-Babi al-Halabi wa
Shurakah undated); Ibn Qayyim, 2 I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in 20 (Dar al-Kutub al-Hadithah 1969). There
are other maxims that carry the same meaning, such as "Al-ghurm bi al-gbunm." See, for example,

Abdul Basir bin Mohamad, Vicarious Liabilioy: A Study of the Liability of Employer and Employee in the
Islamic Law of Tort, 15 Arab L Q 197, 203 & n 32 (Feb 2000). Hadith may be understood as the
written record of the Sunnah (defined below). See generally, Ibn Salah al-Shahrazuri, An
Introduction to the Science of the Hadith (Kitab Ma'nfat anwa' 'i/m al-hadith) (Garnet 2006) (Dr. Eerik
Dickinson, trans).
6

Contemporary Islamic finance has come to prefer the term musharakab, derived from the same
root as the word sharikah. Both terms are commonly translated as "partnership" and denote a
certain form of co-ownership, as further explained below. To prevent possible confusion with
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"partnership" and defined in greater detail below, most closely approximates
modern conventional private equity transactions in which there is joint
contractual ownership in an enterprise. To date, however, Islamic financial
transactions have been based primarily on two alternative forms: the murabahah
contract,7 and the ijarah contract.8 Proponents of musharakah, or of Islam's
profit- and loss-sharing principles, lament the overuse of these two forms largely
because they allow Islamic bankers to more easily and closely mimic the
substance and economics of prohibited conventional financings, such as
interest-bearing loans.
While this contention is not without merit, it does not account for the
youth of the Islamic finance industry among the other social, economic, and
political realities in which the industry is situated. Given the current operational
structure of Islamic banks and the nature of the risks involved in equity
transactions, Islamic banks may not yet be fully ready to regularly undertake
such investment transactions. 9 Moreover, the use of murabahah- and iarah-based
transactions, and the current state of Islamic private equity, must both be
understood in light of the goals of the Islamic finance industry's first phase.
Having begun only some thirty to forty years ago, and given the current state of
its development, Islamic finance is only in its nascent stages as an industry. As
such, Islamic finance occupies a niche within the larger world of conventional
finance-a world within which it must successfully operate and a world that

partnership under certain modern nations' laws, I have endeavored to use the Arabic terms.
Where the Arabic term is not used, readers are asked to keep in mind that a sharikah is not the
exact equal of a partnership under Anglo-American laws.
7

The term murabahab is often translated as "cost plus mark-up sale." See generally Mahmoud ElGamal, 1 Financial Transactionsin IslamicJuriprudence:A Translation of Dr. Wahba al-Zuhayi'sAl-Fiqh
al-Islami wa Adillatuhu (Islamic Jurisprudence and its Proofs) 381-434 (Dar al-Fikr 1997) (hereinafter
cited to as al-Zahayli, 1 FinancialTransactions). The Maliki school defines the murabahabcontract as
one in which a "seller informs [a] buyer of the cost at which the seller obtained an object of sale,
and collects a profit margin either as a lump sum, or the seller may state the profit margin as a
percentage or ratio of the seller's original purchase price." Id. Contemporary murabahah
transactions may be described as follows: a buyer requests a party (the seller) to purchase an item
so that the buyer can, in turn, purchase such item for the seller. The seller informs the buyer of
the seller's price and costs and the two agree upon a profit margin. Generally, in contemporary
Islamic financial transactions, the seller is a financial institution and the sale by the seller to the
buyer occurs on a deferred installment basis. See Moghul and Ahmed, 27 Fordham Intl L J at 173
(cited in note 1).

8

An iarahis a lease contract that has been extended in contemporary Islamic finance to the context
of finance leases as well as operating leases. For a discussion of classical rules relating to i/arab, see
al-Zuhayli, 1 FinancialTransactions at 381-434 (cited in note 7).
See generally Habib Ahmed, Operational Structure for Islamic Equity Finance: Lessons From Venture
Capital (Islamic Research and Training Inst 2005), available online at <http://www.irtipms.org/
OpenSave.asp?pub=212.pdf> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
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evaluates it by assumptions, theories, and parameters that are not wholly
consistent with those of Islamic finance or the religion of Islam.
Generally, the beginning stages of Islamic finance may be said to have the
following goals: (i) educating the market with respect the underlying rationale of
Islamic finance, its need, and its differentiation from conventional finance; (ii)
implementing and manifesting at least some underlying principles through the
consummation of transactions; (iii) establishing bodies for the purposes of
education and self-regulation, among others; 10 and (iv) garnering recognition
within the greater financial and political community as a viable-and perhaps
morally and economically superior-means of conducting business through the
demonstration of demand, transaction consummation, and profit.
Initially, Islamic finance had little choice but to place itself in the broader
international financial arena, thus facing numerous challenges with respect to
educating and persuading financial institutions and authorities. In addition,
Islamic finance practitioners face regulatory frameworks that either are not
designed to cover Islamic transactions or are preferential to conventional
finance. Practically speaking, these regulatory frameworks cannot be expanded
or modified quickly. It therefore was-and perhaps still is-both impractical and
unwise in such a context to seek to conduct purely or predominantly equity
transactions along Islamic lines.
The difficulty in undertaking Islamic financial transactions within the
conventional finance paradigm must not be underestimated. Looking only to the
US, the applicable regulatory framework can be very restrictive when it comes to
certain aspects of Islamic transactional law. The efforts of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") (and some state authorities, such as that
of Connecticut),"' for instance, which are very important and ought to be
applauded, permit US banks to engage in Islamic transactions but on terms that
favor a more formalistic approach averse to certain risk allocations prescribed by
Islamic law.' 2 To these challenges, there are alternatives, including the persistent
education of the financial and regulatory communities and the exploration of

10

11
12

Such organizations include the Islamic Financial Services Board ("IFSB") and Accounting and
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions ("AAOIFI"). For more information, see
generally IFSB, available online at <http://www.ifsb.org> (visited Jan 15, 2007); AAOIFI,
available online at <http://www.aaoifi.com> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
State of Connecticut, Department of Banking, Advisory Opinion, No 2 (Nov 10, 2005).
Of course, the OCC letters concerning murabahah and iarah do not specify what principles of
Islamic law cannot be adhered to. They are concerned with how lawfully to conduct such
transactions under US banking regulations. See Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, "Interest" and the Paradox
of Contemporary IslamicLaw and Finance 23, available online at <http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-elgamal/
files/interest.pdf> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
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alternative capital sources and financiers capable of greater structural flexibility,
and thus greater compliance with Islamic laws.
Having primarily employed musharakah alongside mudarabah13 as the
foundation of the Islamic finance industry would have exposed what is in effect
a start-up industry to great risk of financial loss through the inherent risks of
such transaction forms. 4 Furthermore, during the early stages of Islamic finance,
the exclusive or almost exclusive utilization of musharakab and mudarabah would
have been an even greater concern because of the deficiency of human capital
and the dearth of targets for equity investing in the Muslim world. Moreover,
this arguably less-compromising stance would have prevented necessary
diversification. This latter consequence by itself could have threatened the
viability of Islamic finance by limiting its attractiveness. By utilizing murabahah
and ijarah as they did, Islamic financiers found greater common ground with
conventional finance and thereby limited transactional and certain other risks
and reduced various burdens, such as those relating to education and approval.
Industry proponents and participants selected a means by which Islamic finance
would most probably become better able to achieve its initial aims. 5
The path selected by Islamic finance has raised the question whether
finding common ground with conventional finance was best achieved by largely
replicating the substance though not the form of conventional transactions. 6
Islamic finance, as noted previously, has to date largely consisted of murabahahand iarah-based transactions-the risk and return profiles of which bear striking
similarities to conventional instruments and mechanisms, but the outward forms
of which differ. For example, most everyone would agree that ijarah transactions
are an important tool for the Islamic (or any other) financier. But actual
contemporary Islamic leasing transactions in the US have raised the question

13

14

'5

16

The mudarabah, a silent or limited partnership contract, involves the contribution by an owner of
capital to one who will manage or invest that capital on the former's behalf. Profits are shared
using an agreed upon formula (generally speaking). Financial losses are borne by the provider of
capital while the entrepreneur can lose only his efforts. See al-Zuhayli, 1 FinancialTransactions at
487-501 (cited in note 7).
Of course, the religious counterargument based on tawakkul (reliance on God) could be made
here and would not be without merit. Consider Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Faith in Divine Uniy &
Trust in Divine Providence (Fons Vitae 2001) (David Burrell, trans). See also Charles Tripp, Islam and
the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism 142-43 (Cambridge 2006) ("Bad decisions by a
number of [Islamic] banks in the early, optimistic years of Islamic banking had led to considerable
losses and diminished the attraction of [musharakahand mudarabab] financing as a general rule.").
Probability can be and very often is binding in Islamic law. See Bernard G. Weiss, The Spirit of
Islamic Law 88-112 (Georgia 1998).
Of course, there are a few who would argue whether finding common ground was itself
appropriate.
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why rules pertaining to loss sharing and risk allocation are not fully
implemented. 7
In response to these concerns, one might argue that immediate
implementation of the substance of Islamic financial laws,' 8 wholly and without
compromise, would have likely resulted in failure-or at least been less likely to
achieve success.' 9 Islamic finance proponents increasingly contend that more of
the substance of Islamic laws could have been, or now should be, implemented
in light of the purposes of Islamic finance and the economic success it has seen.
As interest by Muslims in their religion increases, this will likely result in greater
substantive implementation coupled with the appropriate forms. An alternative
approach might be to regulate some of the existing conventional institutions and
mechanisms with the substantive rationale of classical Islamic legal principles.
The current course of Islamic finance may very well prove to have been
wise. Conducting and closing transactions has revealed the industry's
deficiencies as well as its strengths while allowing a jurisprudence to develop
gradually in light of actual instances and realities. Perhaps then, the reliance on
murabahah and ijarah during this introductory phase was appropriate. Yet, it does
not follow from such a conclusion that these two contract forms, as currently
implemented, are the most suitable methods for approaching the next phases of
Islamic finance, which proponents of Islamic finance hope to be more

17

It must be noted that

18

transactions can be and are arguably more compliant with Islamic principles than others.
The distinction between form and substance is a matter addressed by the discipline of ta'lil, or

iarah transactions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some such

ratiocination, within Islamic jurisprudence. Consider Ahmad Raysuni, Imam al-Shatibi's Theory of the
Higher Objectives and Intents of Islamic Law xiv (Ind Ins of Islamic Thought 2005). Jurists have
generally held that each rule of law in the realm of mu'amalat (temporal, in distinction to spiritual,
matters) is based on an occasioning factor or effective cause ('illah) and a rationale (hikmah) to
bring about ease and remove hardship. Id at xxv-xxx.
The theory of objectives is generated by sound, rational investigation based on
the belief that the Law of God can be nothing other than a law of wisdom and
mercy, justice and equity, judicious planning and accurate assessment, since it
is on the basis of these qualities that God deals with all His creatures, and
since they are necessitated by Divine perfections.

19

Id at xxxiv. Matters of contract and finance fall in the realm of mu'amalaf the realm of Islamic law
that is mutable and dynamic, and thus consistent with the temporal and material aspects of
human existence and life in this world. This is of special significance to contemporary Islamic
finance since classical Islamic legal theories envision the necessity of applying Islamic principles to
newly arisen contexts and provide for mechanisms to create new laws. At a particular level, the
"substance" of Islamic law-important for constructing new law--might be said to be found in
the preservation of the 'illah and hikmah, as well as in the purposes of the law (maqasidal-Shai'ah).
Id at xxv-xxx. Form is an important consideration not to be cast aside quickly, for it is seen by
many jurists as a probable indicator that the substance of the law has been implemented.
1 must note that this argument should not be construed as a justification for hyper-formalism or
for building a body of law based on exceptions resulting from doctrines of need and necessity.
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substantively innovative. A number of sociological realities have come to pass
over the last few years enabling the subject transaction and that will likely further
enable Islamic financiers to venture more consistently and more deeply into the
realm of private equity with a higher probability of success. 20 This has and will
continue to bring about the industry's desired objectives.
III. PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Since its inception, the value of assets managed by Islamic finance has
grown quickly. Similarly, the number of regularly contributing financial
institutions has increased, particularly in the Muslim world where a number of
previously conventional institutions have either added Islamic windows or
converted their operations entirely in an effort to comply with Islamic principles
and meet customer demand. In support of this growth, the number of those
servicing the industry, whether by providing legal advice, accounting services, or
technological support, has increased.
Although the industry's size remains relatively small at approximately 1
percent of aggregate regional GDP,2' private equity in the Muslim world has
seen tremendous growth in the recent past. i i Having raised, for example, $2.3
billion in 2005, private equity has become one of the fastest growing sectors in
the Gulf Cooperation Council area ("GCC").23 As of October 2005, of the
approximately 46 private equity funds operating in the Middle East, over 48
percent are in the fundraising stage.24 By some estimates, this industry has
experienced a compounded annual growth rate of approximately 41 percent over
the 5-year span ending in 2004.25 This growth has been fueled in part by high oil

20

This is of course not to imply or infer that i/arah or murabahab transactions should be abandoned

21

wholesale, but perhaps further modified in their implementation to accord with the goals of
Islamic finance's coming phases. The ability to make such modifications when a US bank is
involved is severely limited because of US banking regulations and most US banks' expectations.
See Khaled Fouad and Syed Farhan Zeidi, Middle East Private Equioy: The Sleeping Giant, Banker
Middle East (Oct 2005), available online at <http://www.bankerme.com/bme/2005/oct/
national_investor.asp> (visited Jan 15, 2007).

22

23
24
25

Middle East Private Equioy Industry 'GainingGround', Gulf Daily News (May 7, 2006), available online
at <http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/lyrarcAricles.asp?Article =142924&Sn=BUSI&
IssueID=29048&date=5/7/2006> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
See Unicorn Investment Bank, Global Private Equioy Division, available online at <http://
www.unicorninvestmentbank.com/default.asp?action=article&ID=37> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
Fouad and Zeidi, Middle East Private Equiy at 1 (cited in note 21).
Abraaj Launches ME Private Equity Report, Abraaj Capital Press Release, available online at
<http://www.abraaj.com/mediacenter/Files/pr/AbraajFILE-13-5-2006-03-37-48_28.AbraajlaunchesMEPE-report.pdf> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
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prices and the various factors encouraging investors to keep their wealth in local
markets.26 Of course, significant challenges remain, including the dearth of
corporate targets, which has resulted in the deployment of only 8 percent of
raised funds,27 and the absence of a broader culture of early stage venture capital
to support later stage private equity. A strong infrastructure supporting private
equity-including IT services for back end support, more accessible angel
investors, and effective marketing services-is also very much needed.
Islamic private equity, as a subset of the broader Middle Eastern private
equity market, has also grown. The first Islamic investment fund was launched
during the 1980s and, over the past fifteen years, Islamic private equity has
gradually evolved.28 In the US, Islamic private equity has been in existence for
about a decade, beginning (to the best of our knowledge) with the operations of
Arcapita in 1997, which has focused on US and European private equity deals in
the form of corporate and real property investments.29 Other Islamic private
equity firms transact in the US from time to time, often in real estate and
increasingly in privately held companies. Most do not maintain a regular physical
presence within the US, unlike Arcapita and the more recently established
Unicorn Investment Bank.3° Generally, Islamic private equity firms have
acquired controlling interests in their targets to ensure, among other things, that
they continue to operate per Islamic law post-investment.
IV. ISLAMIC LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
One cannot properly understand Islamic finance without first grasping, at
least at a basic level, Islamic law and jurisprudence. The Shari'ah 31-frequently,
but incompletely, translated as "Islamic law"-constitutes the interaction of
beliefs, values, and legal guidelines designed to maintain a proper balance

26

Tariq al-Rifai, Private Equity Funds Shine as Local Stock Markets Decline, Islamic Bus & Fin Mag 26-

27

28 (Apr 26, 2006).
Rima Fattouh and Abe S. Saad, Private Equity in the Middle East: No Longer a Mirage, 23 ABANA

28

Rev 1 (Fall 2006).
Al-Rifai, PrivateEquity Funds Shine at 26 (cited in note 26).

29

About Arcapita: Overview, available

30

overview.html> (visited Jan 15, 2007). See also Arthur Macdonald, Arcapita Finalises $4.2b Irish
Electrid Takeover, Bus Trib 16 (Dec 11, 2006) (stating that Arcapita has completed transactions
valued in the aggregate in excess of $18 billion).
See Unicorn Investment Bank (cited in note 23).

31

online

at <http://www.arcapita.com/about/corporate/

For a general introduction to Islam, see Roger DuPasquier, Unveiling Islam (Islamic Texts Society
1992) (T.J. Winter, trans). One must not assume that because a matter is law within Islam that it is
therefore to be enforced by some governmental authority. See Sherman A. Jackson, Islamic Law
and the State: The ConstitutionalJurisprndenceof Sbihab al-Din al-,Qarafi 185-224 (EJ Brill 1996).
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between the spiritual
and temporal components of existence in this world and
2
Hereafter.1
the
The primary sources of the Shari'ah are the Qur'an33 and the Sunnah and
the rules contained therein.3 4 Detailed practical laws are derived by the
application of usul al-fiqh: the methods of reasoning and rules of interpretation
applied to the texts of the Shari'ah. The result of this interpretive process is
known as fiqh, a term the author has chosen to translate as "Islamic law."35
Jurists acknowledge that although the sources of Islamic law are divine, their
derivation and application is a construct of the human intellect. This is reflected
in the epistemology of the legal reasoning they constructed. 6
The goals and objectives of the Shari'ah are known in Arabic as maqasid
3 7 Securing benefit
al-Shari'ah.
and preventing harm in this life and in connection
with the Hereafter are the most important considerations (maslahah) of Islamic
law.38 In order for any rule of Islamic law to be valid and applicable, it must not,
among other things, violate the ultimate intent and purpose of the Shari'ah.3 9

32

33

34

35
36

37

38

39

Moghul and Ahmed, 27 Fordham Intl L J at 158 n 24 (cited in note 1) (stating "The terms
'Islamic law' and Shari'ah are frequently used interchangeably in Western scholarship. It is an
oversimplification, however, to equate the Shari'ah with law. The Shari'ah-which we have
deliberately chosen not to translate in this Article-may be said to contain law, but one must also
recognize that it embraces elements and aspects that are not, strictly speaking, law because they
are beyond our conventional understanding of law."). See also Bernard G. Weiss, The Search for
God's Law: Islamic Jurisprudencein the Writing of Sayf al-Din al-Amidi 1 (Utah 1992).
For Muslims, the Qur'an is the "the book containing the speech of God revealed to the Prophet
Muhammad." Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Priniples of Islamic Jurisprudence 16 (Islamic Texts
Society 2003). The Qur'an contains approximately five hundred specific legal injunctions and, for
the most part, sets general guiding principles. See Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of
Its Origin and Elements, 1J of Islamic L 1, 21 (1996).
Michael Mumisa, Islamic Law: Theory and Inteqpretation 56 (Amana 2002) ("In its juristic usage,
Sunnah refers to the normative practice set up by the Prophet of Islam as a model; his sayings,
doings, and tacit approvals which were later established as legally binding precedents in addition
to the law established by the Qur'an.").
See Jackson, Islamic Law and the State at 121 (cited in note 31) (translating fiqh as "practical
jurisprudence proper").
See, for example, A. Kevin Reinhart, When Women Went to Mosques: al-Aydini on the Duralion of
Assessments, in Masud, Messick, and Powers, eds, Islamic Legal Interpretation116 (cited in note 3).
See generally Raysuni, Higher Objectives and Intents (cited in note 18). See also Imran Ahsan Khan
Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law: the Methodolgy of Ijtihad 237 (Islamabad: Islamic Research Inst 1994)
("Theories") (stating that, according to al-Shatibi, the purposes of the law have been inferred
inductively from the texts).
Id at 242-44 (commenting that there is a lengthy and rich discourse surrounding the ultimate
intent of the law and the Lawgiver).
Id at 222-23, 242. In addition to the concepts of maslahah and maqasid al-Shari'ah,there exists the
concept of ratiocination, or ta'lil,employed by Muslim jurists when searching into, and deriving
Islamic law from, the Shai'ah. Here, Islamic jurisprudence is concerned with the occasioning
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A. LEGAL MAXIMS
Islamic legal maxims generally take the form of short phrases or sentences
that express a general principle or objective of the Shari'ah derived from the
corpus of fJqh. As such, they should not be confused with the discipline of usul
alfiqh, which is used to derive law from the Qur'an and Sunnah. While some
legal maxims apply only to specific branches of the law, others (known in Arabic
as al-qawa'ida/-fiqhyyah al-asiyyah) are of general application' 0 Since legal maxims
are stated so briefly and in such general terms, they rarely apply absolutely or
without exception or particularization. 4'
B. THE LEGAL MAXIM AT HAND
The maxim "al-kharaj bi-daman" is a hadith, the meanings and implications
of which are supported by various other texts of the Shari'ah.42 Jurists have

constructed additional maxims with the same meaning and import, all derived
from a myriad of textual sources. That the source of this particular maxim is (as
opposed to having been derived from) a Prophetic statement strengthens its
authority as a principle, and this authority is then further strengthened by the
presence of numerous other textual sources presenting similar content. As a
general, rather than specific Islamic legal maxim, it must be considered and
relied upon in light of other Islamic laws. Moreover, the maxim is applicable as
a general rule in all financial arrangements, whether private equity, leasing, or
otherwise.
One may argue that the primary purpose of this particular maxim is to
more fairly balance or situate counterparties. Read in isolation, one may think
factor ('illah) and rationale (hikmah) of a law to assist not only in understanding, but further
extending and applying the law. The establishment and preservation of the maqasid al-Shariah
follows from proper application of ta'lil. For more information regarding the science of
ratiocination (ta'li
in Islamic jurisprudence, see Muhammad Mustafa Shalabi, Ta'lil al-Ahkam
(Beirut: Dar al-Nahda al-Arabiyya 1981).
40

These general maxims include: (i) "Harm must be eliminated," (ii)
"Acts are judged by their
intentions," (iii)
"Custom is the basis of judgment," and (iv) "Certainty is not overruled by
doubt." See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Qawa'id al-Fiqh: The Legal Maxims of Islamic Law, 3
Muslim Lawyer (Oct 1998), available online at <http://aml.org.uk/journal/3.2/Kamali%20%20Qawaid%20al-Fiqh.pdf> (visited Jan 15, 2007) (noting that the development of legal maxims
represents a somewhat latent development in Islamic legal history).

41

For example, the maxim "custom is the basis of judgment" permits a court of law to rule on the
basis of customary practice where a text of the Shari'ah does not regulate the matter; provided,
however, among other things, that such customary practice is not inconsistent with the Shari'ah.
Consequently, when a contract is silent as to how an issue is to be addressed, the customary rule
may be dispositive. Id.
Readers are reminded that this statement may be translated as "[Entitlement to] profit must be

42

accompanied by a liability for loss."
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that this maxim allows the payment and receipt of interest on a loan of money
because a conventional lender bears a credit risk. Alternatively, one might
contend that this maxim unfairly requires a financier to bear market risks in
addition to bearing the opportunity cost of unavailable capital. Relying on the
prohibition of riba (discussed below), a Muslim jurist might counter that the
mere lending of money does not entitle one to gain, for such a gain is unjust for
a variety of economic reasons that underlie its forceful condemnation by the
Shari'ah. Capital providers must, therefore, also share in the risk of the financed
asset or venture along with its other owners. Wealth (ma) alone does not
provide sufficient entitlement to profit.43 Moreover, and perhaps more
interestingly, a Muslim jurist might also present the converse: a party should not
be taxed with a burden-the market risk-without a corresponding right to
4
gain.

This maxim thus addresses issues of liability, distinguishing lawful profit
from other receipts on capital as well as labor, which may constitute riba if there
is no corresponding, appropriate liability for lOSS. 45 As such, this legal maxim
significantly impacts the rights and responsibilities of investors and issuers in
private equity transactions.
C. ISLAMIC FINANCIAL LAWS
In many respects, Islamic finance is akin to socially conscious investing
since there are, what we might term, substantive principles that speak to the
lawfulness of an investment. These laws guide, as to the purpose for which
invested money is used, the selection of the target company based on its line of
business and the selection of activities that will be advanced by the invested
capital. Industries such as gambling, pornography, alcohol, tobacco, and
conventional financial and insurance industries are prohibited under these
substantive principles.
However, unlike socially conscious investing, Islamic finance also offers
procedural principles that speak to the mechanism by which financing or
investing occurs. These principles are primarily, though not exclusively,
concerned with how capital providers invest money. These rules, especially those

43

The Hanafi jurist al-Kasani writes: "The rule in our view is that entitlement to profit is either due
to wealth... or work ... or by bearing a liability for loss .... As for entitlement [to profit relating
to wealth], it is obvious, because profit is a growth in wealth and belongs to its owner. It is for
this reason that the rabb al-mal in a contract of mudarabah is entitled to profit and likewise the
partner." Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Law of Business Organizaions: Partnerships69-70 (Kitab
Bhavan 1999).

44

Admittedly, there are Islamic directives as to what constitutes proper burden and legitimate gain.

45

Nyazee, Partnershipsat 42 (cited in note 43).
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prohibiting fiba, overlap somewhat with the substantive principles by governing
how profits and losses are allocated and distributed.
D. THE PROHIBITION OF RIBA
Perhaps the most well-known principle of Islamic finance is its prohibition
of fiba, which in its most common contemporary understanding, is said to
include interest on a loan.4 6 One reason advanced for this is that the Shari'ah
countenances lending money as a charitable activity and not as a profit-making
venture.47 The prohibition of nba also applies to trading that involves certain
other commodities, such as certain foodstuffs, gold, and silver. When these
commodities are traded, the trades must be made in equal measure and without
deferment.4 As can be expected, riba presents many other complexities and
subtleties for financial transactions.
Instead of financing a venture through a "plain vanilla" interest bearing
loan, what we commonly find today in Islamic finance is the use of leasing and
asset sales or financings where the contribution of money is tied to risk relating
to an asset. As explained above, this is because rules derived from the
prohibition of riba demand that a financing party bear risk in order to earn
profit. This risk must not only be a credit risk-for otherwise interest on a loan
would be permitted if not encouraged-but a market or entrepreneurial risk as
well. Partnerships and equity arrangements in which the capital provider's profits
and losses are contractually tied to that of the venture thus lend themselves
more readily to Islamic finance and are arguably more compliant than other
more common arrangements seen in contemporary Islamic finance. Yet there
are important distinctions between conventional private equity transactions and
Islamic principles.

46

Compare al-Zuhayli, 1 FinantialTransacions at 338 (cited in note 7). Muslim jurists have almost
unanimously forbidden commercial bank interest. Id at 339-52 (presenting and refuting the
arguments of those who contend that banking interest should be permitted).

47

See Frank Vogel and Samuel Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Return 77-86

48

49

(Kluwer 1998); Ibn Rushd, 2 The DisinguishedJurist's Primer: A Translation of Bidaat al-Mujtahid
158-75 (Garnet 1996) (Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, trans).
Al-Zuhayli, 1 FinancialTransactions311-14 (cited in note 7) (explaining the types of tiba).
Also worthy of mention, though less relevant to our discussion of the subject transaction than the
prohibition of riba, is the prohibition of bay' al-gharar(aleatory sales). "[Tihe prohibition against
sales involving risk and uncertainty (bay' al-gharar) is based on the dual assumption that (1) the
element of risk and uncertainty is great and (2) the transactions involves harm which equals or
exceeds the degree which the prohibition is intended to prevent." Raysuni, Higher Objectives and
Intents at 48 (cited in note 18). Transactions that entail what is inherently a low degree of risk and
uncertainty or of which the benefits outweigh the harms prevented by prohibiting or disapproving
the transaction fall outside this prohibition. Id. It should be noted that benefit or harm each has
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V. PARTNERSHIPS
There is virtually no fundamental disagreement among Muslim jurists
regarding the legality of a sharikah, or partnership. However, the permissible
forms and purposes of a sharikah and the detailed Islamic laws that govern the
relationships among partners are subject to a difference of opinion among the
schools of Islamic jurisprudence. s° Detailed rules concerning partnerships are
based in large part on the parties' mutual agreement and appropriate mercantile
customs."' Most of these differences are beyond the purview of this Article and
are thus only presented to the extent relevant to our purposes.
Frequently, classical Muslim jurists employed the term sharikah to apply
broadly to various forms of joint ownership or participation. Existing laws in
Muslim countries employ this word, or the related word shirkah, in various ways
to denote various forms of partnerships and other business organizations. 2
Broadly speaking, their definitions agree that a sharikah is a collective right held
by two or more persons to deal with, or in any part of,jointly owned property,
thereby sharing in any profits arising therefrom. 3 The sharikah comes in two
primary forms: (i) those that arise without a contractual agreement 4 and (ii)
those that do arise by way of a contractual agreement (sharikahal-'aqa).5
Islamic private equity investments arise by contractual agreement, and
primarily for this reason, the sharikab al-'aqdis most important for our purposes.
The sharikah al-'aqd is articulated (i) by the Hanafis, as "an agreement between
two or more persons for common participation in capital and profits"; 6 (ii) by

52

its own definition and meaning within that context of Islam that generally exclude the gratification
of whims, caprices or short-lived pleasures. Id at xxxv.
See Khaled Abou El Fad], The Place of Tolerance in Islam in Joshua Cohen and Ian Lague, eds, The
Place of Tolerance in Islam 6 (Beacon 2002) (stating that "Traditionally, Islamic epistemology
tolerate[s] and even celebrate[s] divergent opinions and schools of thought."). There are four
exting Sunni schools of Islamic law: the Hanafi, the Maliki, the Shafi'i, and the Hanbali. See
George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges and Instituions of Learning in Islam and the West 2 (Edinburgh
1981).
Al-Zuhayli, 1 FinancialTransacfions at 445-50 (cited in note 7). For an introduction to the role
played by custom ('uf) in Islamic law, see Kamali, Princplesat 369-83 (cited in note 33).
Nyazee, Partnershipsat 13 (cited in note 43).

53

Id.

54

This would indude, for example, a joint ownership of a thing arising by joint purchase or joint
receipt (by gift or inheritance, for example) known in Arabic as sharikah al-milk. Id at 35-37.

55

Sharikah al-'aqd includes several subcategories regarding which Muslim jurists have differing
opinions. Id at 39.
Id at 17-18 (quoting Commission of Ottoman Jurisits (1867-77), Majallat alAhkam al-Adliyah 5
1329 (Constantinople 1305)). Among the differences between a sharikah al-milk and a sharikah al'aqdare that the latter requires the formation of a contract and that the latter's principal purpose is
profit sharing, whereas this is either not the purpose of or prohibited by the former.

50

51

56
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the Malikis, as "a permission [granted by] each [ ] participant to the others [ ] to
transact in [such granting participant's] wealth and on their own behalf, while
retaining the right to transact personally (in such wealth)"; 7 (iii) by the Shafi'is,
as "in its literal meaning [a] mixing[,] and technically... an established[,]
undivided right in a single thing or... a contract implying this";" and (iv) by the
Hanbalis, as a "participation of two or more persons in transactions."59 The
jurist 'Ali al-Khafif offers what is intended to be a more broadly articulated
definition: a "contract between two or more people for participation in capital
and its profits, or for participation in transactions in someone else's capital and
its profits, or for the participation in profit without participation in capital or
transactions. ,,60
A. UNDERLYING CONTRACTUAL BASES
A variety of contracts underlie the sharikah, regulating the relationships
among partners. Of these, the contracts of amanah (trust), wakalah (agency), and
kafalah (surety) are relevant to our purposes. 61
Translated as a "trusteeship," the contract of amanab requires that the
jointly-owned property of a sharikab be held by each owner on behalf of the
others. Consequently, if the property is destroyed (through no fault of any
partner), the liability for bearing such loss is borne by the other partners on a
pro rata basis.
Through the contract of wakalah, each partner within a sharikah is an agent
of the others. The Hanafi school distinguishes between such a contract's
objective (hukm) and the means employed or the rights and obligations relating
to performance (huquq) to achieve that objective.62 The objective of a sales
contract, namely the transfer of title to the asset, passes to the co-owners on a
pro rata basis (though in contemporary lslamic transactions it is held in the
name of the business entity constituting the joint venture). 63 But the huquq do

57

58

59

Id at 19 (quoting Abd al'Aziz al-Khayyat, 1 al-Sharikat42 (Ammam: Wizarat al-Awqaf 1971)).
Id (quoting Shams al-Din Muhammad ibn Abu al-'Abbas Shihab al-Din Ahmad ibn Ahmad ibn
Hamzah al-Ramli, 5 Nihayat al-Muhtaj li-Sharb al-Minhaj 3 (Cairo 1967)).
Id (quoting Muwaffaq al-Din Abu Muhammad "Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad Ibn
Qudamah, 5 al-Mughnifi Fiqh Imam al-Sunnah Ahmad ibn Hanbal al-Shaybani 3 (Cairo: al-Matba'ah
al-Salafiyah wa-Maktubatuha 1962)).

60

Id at 20.

61

Id at 57-63. The contract of iarah may also underlie a sharikab.

62

Id at 59.

63

Interestingly, one of the actions which Hanafis list
among the rights of a partner isthat each
partner must fulfill all obligations and collect all rights associated with contracts in which he or
she engages.
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not pass to the owners; rather, they remain with the transacting partners.64 The
Hanafis and Hanbalis rule that a partner may trade with any part of the capital in
any form of transaction. The Shafi'is state, in summary form, that a partner may
deal in any manner acceptable for a legal agent and in any manner that cannot
harm the other partners.65 Accordingly, any lawful act undertaken by a partner
on behalf of the sharikah is governed by the rules of wakalah.66 For example, if a
partner purchases an asset on behalf of the sharikah, the other partners own a
share in that asset on a pro rata basis. Other jurists, including the Shafi'is and
some Hanbalis, exclude partners from using the capital of the sharikab in credit
sales. Others add that a partner does not have the right to put the sharikah in
debt unless he has been granted explicit permission to do so.67
If partners elect to integrate the contract of kafalah within their
relationship, each becomes a surety for the other, permitting any partner to be
liable, both for his or her own share and that of his or her partners, for the
performance of contracts entered into by any partner. This may be analogized to
American laws of joint and several liability.68
B. CONDITIONS TO VALIDITY
Muslim jurists typically set forth a host of conditions coupled with
particular contract forms. Their intent is not that all of these conditions always
or only follow from the use of a particular contract form, but rather that the
mere use of the name of a particular contract form triggers the applicability of all
such conditions, unless the parties have lawfully stipulated their own
conditions.6 9 Thus, there is no requirement to restate in a contract, whether
written or oral (for which this method is especially designed), all of these
conditions. Thus, if contracting parties conclude a sharikah without mentioning
which type, the Hanafis assert that such a sharikah shall by default constitute an
'inan,70 the subcategory of sharikah a!-'aqdwith which we are concerned.
Sharikah aI-'inan (of which there are further subcategories) may be defined
as a "contract based either on wakalah, or on wakalah as well as kafalab, that
64

Id.

65
66

Al-Zuhayli, 1 FinancialTransactions467, 469 (cited in note 7).
Nyazee, Partnerships69 (cited in note 43).

67

AI-Zuhayli, 1 FinandalTransactions468-69 (cited in note 7).

68

Nyazee, Partnershipsat 62 (cited in note 43).

69

Id at 25. See also Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Islamic CommercialLaw: An Analysis of Futures and
Options 70 (Islamic Texts Society 2000) ("The forms of trading and transactions that the Qur'an
and Sunnah have explicitly validated are not exhaustive, and do not prcclude new varieties on
which the Shari'ah might have remained silent.").

70

Nyazee, Partnershipsat 26 (cited in note 43).
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permits (i) participation from both sides with wealth, work, or credit-worthiness,
and (ii) the sharing of profits in an agreed upon ratio.'' At a minimum, an 'inan
contract implies that each partner is the agent of the others, that no one of them
is a surety for any other, and that the undivided share of one partner in
possession of the share of another partner is governed by the rules of amanab.
Certain elements (arkan; sing, rukn) and conditions (shuru/; sing, shar) have
been stipulated for any valid shafikab, including the 'inan.7 2 Because the 'inan is a
contract-based partnership, the various conditions relating to a valid contract,
such as proper authority to contract, are applicable.73 Partners must comply with
a variety of additional conditions that include:7 4
(1)

(2)

As readers may recall, the contract of agency underlies, and the
contract of kafalah may also underlie, a sbarikah agreement. As such,
partners must have legal authority to contract, delegate authority, and
serve as guarantors.
The majority of jurists, including the Hanafis, hold that the sbarikab
75
capital must be specified and present at the time of contract.
Generally, the Hanafis, Malikis, and Hanbalis rule that it is not
necessary to mix the contributed properties because the purposes of
the partnership contract and its underlying contracts may be realized

71

Id at 102.

72

A rkn is defined as that which is inherent or internal to the contract (or act) and which, if absent
or unfulfilled, renders the contract invalid such that all legal consequences of it would not follow.
See 'Abd al-Karim Zaydan, al-Wlajizfi Usulal-Fiqh59 (Baghdad: Matba'at Salman al-A'zami 1967).
A shart is a factor external to the contract without which it may be deemed, according to the
majority of Muslim jurists, as invalid (bati5 or, according to the Hanafis, as fasid, meaning that
certain of the contract's (or act's) legal consequences follow. Id. The Hanafis maintain that there
is but one element (rukn) to a sharikah contract: offer and acceptance. The majority of jurists,
however, list additional arkan, including the contracting parties and the contract subject matter,
which the Hanafis deem to be conditions (shurull. The distinction between elements and
conditions under Islamic jurisprudence is important for the consequences of contract
enforceability. Were a rukn to be absent, the contract would be void (bati), but were a shart to be
unfulfilled, the contract would be (i) according to the majority, still entirely void (bali,, but (ii) in
the Hanafi estimation unenforceable (fasia) pending completion of the unfulfilled shart. Id at 6567. But this distinction is of little practical significance in contemporary Islamic transactions thus
far (other than Shari'ah committees seeking to ensure the presence of both in the written
contracts), unless the parties were to embody the consequences contractually or perhaps select a
different governing law than they usually do.

73

As generally accepted among Muslim jurists, the arkan of a sales contract are (1) a seller, (2) a
buyer, (3) an object of the contract (both what is priced and the price itself, and (4) expression of
the contract (namely mutual assent in the form of a valid offer and acceptance). See Moghul and
Ahmed, 27 Fordham Intl L J at 165-66 (cited in note 1). See also al-Zuhayl, 1 Financial
Transactions 91-144, 351-58 (cited in note 7). For an introduction to Islamic contract laws, see
Hussain Hamad Hassan, An Introduction to the Study ofIslamic Law 249-496 (Leaf Publications 1997)
(Ahmad Hasan, trans).

74

For a more complete list, see al-Zuhayli, 1 FinancialTransactions at 457-63 (cited in note 7).

75

Id at 458.
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without doing so. An opinion attributed to Abu Hanifa holds that
fungible commodities may be contributed as capital so long as there is
a mixing of the commodities such that they can no longer be
distinguished from the contributions of other partners. However, the
Malikis rule that there must be some mixing, whether legal or physical,
of the partnership properties, to equally incentivize the partners. The
Shafi'is (and certain others), on the other hand, rule that there must be
so as to render
a mixing of the properties prior to contract 7conclusion
6
the contributed properties indistinguishable.
(3)

(4)

Most jurists agree that the capital of a sharikab must be made of
fungible monies, including by analogical reasoning, contemporary
currency. Non-fungibles, it is argued, have varying values, thus
rendering the partners' shares in the capital (and thus shares in profits)
unknown, thereby creating the potential for legal disputes. The
Malikis, however, rule that the capital need not be monetary; nonfungibles may be used, in which case the partners' shares would be
determined based on the market values of their contributions, thus
the likelihood
of legal disputes and mitigating the concern
lessening
• 78
,.
77
. .
for garar on this basis.
Jurists differ over the validity of partnerships established with
fungible, but non-monetary capital, such as goods measured by
weight, volume, or number. The Shafi'i school permits such capital
because such capital contributions, once mixed, can be rendered
indistinguishable. Likewise, Maliki jurists permit this form of capital
on the basis that it can be valued at the time of mixing. The Hanbalis,
on the other hand, prohibit this form of capital. Some Hanafi jurists
hold that so long as the contributions consist of different genera, such

76

Id at 458-59.

77

See note 50.
This condition raises an interesting issue with regard to the securitization of musharakah-based
financings. Upon acquisition by the partnership of substantial non-liquid assets, participation
certificates could be treated as negotiable instruments and bought and sold in the secondary
market. It would be allowable to sell the certificates in the secondary market for the price agreed
upon, which may be more than the face value of the certificate because the subject matter of the
sale is a share in tangible assets, not only in money. However, trading in such certificates would
not be allowed when all the assets of the partnership are in liquid form, such as in cash or
receivables, because of the prohibition of riba. According to Justice Usmani, the Shafi'is would
not permit a certificate that represented ownership in a combination of liquid and nonliquid
assets. According to the Shafi'is, Justice Usmani writes, the non-liquid part of the business would
have to be separated and sold independently. The Hanafi school, however, is of the opinion that
whenever there is a combination of liquid and nonliquid assets, the certificate could be sold and
purchased for an amount greater than the amount of liquid assets in which case the price would
be understood as equal to the amount of liquid assets and any excess above such as the price of
the non-liquid assets. Most contemporary scholars have allowed trading in the units of the whole
only if the non-liquid assets of the business are more than 50 percent of the assets in total.
However, the Hanafis would allow trading of the certificates even if the non-liquid assets equaled
less than 50 percent, so long as the size of the non-liquid assets was not negligible. Muhammad
Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance 18-20 (Kluwer 2002).
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(5)
(6)

(7)

capital can not be utilized, while others contend that if the
contributions are of the same genus, then such capital is permissible.
Of those that favor the permissibility of such fungible, non-monetary
capital, some hold that a shatikab to which such capital is contributed
may be validated on the condition that profits are shared on a pro rata
basis. That is to say, the partners would not have absolute discretion
in setting their profit-sharing ratios.
The ratios of profit-sharing must be known and specified precisely at
the time of contract.
The profit share of each partner may only be specified as a percentage
of the profits of the sharikab. In other words, profit entitlement is not
to be specified as a particular amount nor tied to a particular capital
contribution because the total amount of profits are unknown, and
Islamic law forbids a guaranteed, fixed return. Muslim jurists differ
over whether the ratio of the profit allocated to a partner must equal
the ratio of his or her capital contribution to the total capital
contributed to the sharikah. The Maliki and Shafi'i schools generally
hold that it must, while the Hanbali school permits the partners to
select the profit ratio they deem fit. The Hanafis agree with the
Hanbalis, adding that a passive partner's ratio must be no more than
the ratio of its contribution to the total capital committed.
In the case of loss, nearly all (and according to some commentators,
all)7 9 Muslim jurists agree that partners must share losses on a pro rata
basis based on the ratio of the investment by each to the total capital
committed to the sharikab.

VI. THE SUBJECT TRANSACTION
The subject transaction, as noted in the introduction to this Article,
involved a foreign Islamic investment bank intending to invest in a US
consumer goods business in what is sometimes referred to as a growth equity
investment." The relevance of Islamic law to this transaction begins with the
Islamic investment bank itself; unlike most private equity investors, its
investment approach and focus is subject to an analysis in light of the previously
discussed Islamic financial principles. An Islamic investor must select industries
and businesses that do not violate any of the substantive Islamic principles and
must then also work to ensure that the mechanism of its investment complies
with the previously discussed procedural Islamic principles.
Fortunately, the target company's business in the subject transaction was
already lawful by Islamic standards. Certain protective measures were taken, akin

79

Id at 8.

so

For purposes of this article, an Islamic investment bank refers to an investment bank whose
shareholders, management, and business operates in compliance with Islamic precepts, and/or is
registered under local laws as such.
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to contractual veto rights, to ensure that this would continue to be the case.
Primary concerns then revolved around the procedural principles. The manner
in which the Islamic bank invested in the company and the manner in which the
company had financed and would finance itself had to comply with Islamic
principles.8
Like any private equity investor, this Islamic bank conducted its
preliminary due diligence to determine whether this particular investment
transaction was economically worthwhile. Detailed due diligence in an Islamic
transaction, both financial and legal, must highlight any potential conflicts with
Islamic principles as well as matters that are customary in conventional
transactions. This would include, for instance, whether the company was party
to any conventional interest-bearing financing and might also include whether
any agreements to which it was a party, such as operating leases, were
sufficiently compliant with Islamic principles or whether they would require
amendment. In the case at hand, conventional debt was present in small
amounts and the company was party to certain agreements that either violated or
could lead to violations of Islamic principles. As discussed in greater detail
below, the Islamic investor's Shari'ah committee tolerated certain current
violations, but strictly prohibited future ones.82
As is common with private equity transactions, both the Islamic investor
and the company in this transaction negotiated a variety of financial terms of the
proposed investment at the outset, such as the valuation of the company, until a
term sheet was agreed upon. For the most part, the term sheet contained
customary and standard provisions and language. These included granting the
Islamic investor voting rights, the right to appoint persons to the company's
board of directors, anti-dilution protections, and information rights. Some of
what was negotiated, however, was particular to the Islamic nature of the
transaction, as is discussed in greater detail below. Definitive transaction
documentation, such as the amended and restated charter documentation, stock
purchase agreement, and registration rights agreement, was left to be drafted and
negotiated subsequently, as is the case in conventional transactions.
Because of the congruence between equity investments and Islamic
financial principles generally, Islamic financial institutions are not normally faced
with significant structuring difficulties when acquiring equity in a lawful

81

82

This concern has broader implications that may not be apparent at first. It would, for instance,
limit the target company from acquiring another company with r/ba-bearing indebtedness.
Contemporary Islamic financial institutions typically have a committee of experts whose role is to
provide Islamic legal advice in the course of the institution's affairs. The Shari'ah committee
assists the institution as to how it may structure and document its transactions under Islamic law.
Ultimately, the Shari'ah committee may issue afatwa, declaring the transaction lawful.
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enterprise. These difficulties are lessened by the acquisition of a controlling
share of equity, which has usually been the case with Islamic private equity
investments in the US. However, precisely because this investment was
proposed as an acquisition of a minority interest in the company, it raised a
number of issues, both legal and non-legal, that are discussed below.
It should be noted that the role of US legal counsel in Islamic transactions
is analogous to that of attorneys involved in conventional private equity
transactions. US counsel in any Islamic transaction must also work closely with
its client and its client's Shari'ah committee to develop appropriate structures
and draft documentation that satisfies Islamic legal concerns in light of locally
applicable laws and the parties' respective demands and goals. This frequently
requires a strong theoretical grasp of local laws and customs and requires an
ability to think unconventionally.
A. CONTEMPORARY PRIVATE EQUITY IN LIGHT OF
ISLAMIC LAWS
When considering this private equity transaction in light of classical Islamic
law (or at least the summary thereof presented earlier), readers are informed that
it does not neatly fit within the parameters of any particular classical sharikah
form, though the key features of sharikah al-'nan appear to have been paralleled
in large part. Readers are also reminded that many jurists, as discussed earlier,
permit modifications to the default 'inan form, and this would certainly seem to
have been the case in this instance. Thus, this transaction may be said to be
distinctly modern.
The fruitful approach to modern transactions seeks to first implement the
fundamental principles of Islamic law and then to implement its secondary and
tertiary rules, including the law with respect to particular contract forms to the
extent they remain applicable or have not been lawfully modified by the parties'
agreement.
We may begin by asserting that the company itself constituted the sharikah,
the purpose of which was the advancement of its business and to maximize the
profits derived therefrom. By entering into an equity purchase agreement, and
purchasing the equity structured particularly for it (as discussed below), the
Islamic investor became a co-owner or shareholder in the company. Thus, the
Islamic institution may be said to have entered into a partnership, by way of
written contracts, crystallized in the form of a conventional business entity,
which under local law has a juristic personality distinct from that of its owners.
The notion that a legal entity serves as the sharikah is a departure from classical
formulations of Islamic law. The contractual documentation for this transaction
speaks to the business of the joint enterprise, to the shareholders' rights and
obligations towards one another and towards the company, and the allocation
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and distribution of profits and losses, among other things. In many respects,
these contracts address the underlying contractual bases of a sharikah.
Pursuant to a shareholders' agreement entered into by the Islamic investor
and certain key shareholders, and provisions of other agreements, much of the
substance of the contracts of amanah and wakalah were addressed. The company,
rather than any of its shareholders, owns the assets and business-at least
directly. Financial losses of the company, absent negligence or some other
wrongdoing, are borne by all shareholders in the company on a pro rata basis
proportionate to their respective investments. Actions of the company (whether
entering into contracts or buying and selling property) are only to be taken by
contractually specified individuals adhering to certain norms. The risks and
consequences of all such actions (again, absent any particular shareholder's
wrongdoing) are borne directly by the company and then by its beneficial
owners (namely, the shareholders). These are all key differences from classical
formulations of Islamic laws.
B. EDUCATIONAL CHALLENGE
Any counterparty will seek to have an understanding of those with whom it
does business. This is all the more so in the case of a counterparty entering into
a joint venture which has special operating guidelines. The unique challenge of
this transaction was to persuade the company's management to require that the
company operate pursuant to Islamic guidelines even though the Islamic bank
was to own only a (sizeable) minority share in it.
The religion of Islam has been brought to the fore in current events, and
has piqued the curiosity of many, including within the US financial marketplace.
This is resulting in an increased willingness to learn. As a consequence of both
the financial opportunity and the current liquidity in the Arabian Gulf, a variety
of US institutions seek to participate in Islamic finance. In our experience, US
businesses generally demonstrate a willingness to understand Islamic financial
principles and the flexibility to find solutions (despite incurring increased costs
in doing so). Economic rationale most likely drives this willingness and
flexibility, but there can be other factors as well. The educational process that
was undertaken in the subject transaction took place within the context of the
current domestic and international political climate. Moreover, such an
education does not take place in a single step or occurrence, but involves a
process which itself is evidence of a long term commitment not only to
counterparties and the US market, but to Islamic finance generally.
The subject transaction necessitated providing oral and written guidance
from experts in Islamic law and from US counsel experienced in handling
Islamic transactions. Company management expressed concern as to how
Islamic law impacted its operations and why the term sheet it received differed
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from those of conventional investors. In this case, both the Islamic investment
bank and its US legal counsel had the requisite experience from which to draw a
wealth of information and provide necessary comfort. US counsel must also
possess an ability to explain Islamic finance succinctly in the language of the
listener. Working closely with the Islamic bank, US counsel and the investor
answered a myriad of questions regarding Islam, Islamic law, generally and
Islamic financial law, as well as relevant contemporary Islamic finance practice.
C. THE RELEVANCE OF THE PROHIBITION OF RIBA
The company had in place a conventional working capital facility and other
loans from its founders, which it used, along with several smaller loans from its
founders, to finance its operations. As can be expected, the Shari'ah committee
initially sought to have the loans terminated immediately prior, and as a
condition to, the Islamic bank's investment.13 Management of the target
company was principally concerned with maintaining the revolving loan, viewing
it as important for its future. Ultimately, the matter was settled by tolerating the
existing conventional debt so long as outstanding amounts thereunder did not
exceed certain contractually specified ratios tied to the value of the company at
closing. Thereafter, the incurrence of conventional, but not Islamic, debt was
prohibited. The Islamic bank also succeeded in ensuring that the company
would not use the investment proceeds to repay these loans-instead, the
proceeds were to be used for operations and expansion only. Moreover, the
Islamic bank insisted that so long as it held any equity in the company, any
future financial transactions undertaken by the target had to be compliant with
Islamic law and approved by the Islamic bank's Shari'ah committee. Not only
did this mean that further interest-bearing borrowings, including under the
aforementioned working capital facility, would be prohibited, but also that future
issuances of conventional preferred stock in the company would be prohibited
as well.
Both the company and the Islamic bank and their respective legal counsel
explored various options to address concerns raised by the company about its
consequent future inability to access the conventional debt market and its
estimation that future conventional equity investment was made less likely in
light of the Shari'ah related restrictions. Chief among the proposed alternatives
was the replacement of the revolving credit facility with an Islamic facility, such
as a sale-leaseback, and a commitment by the Islamic investor to provide
83
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additional equity capital upon certain milestones or at a future date. The first of
the aforementioned alternatives brought both parties into discussions with US
banks, including in some smaller marketplaces, and necessitated educating
financiers about Islamic finance and the opportunity presented by undertaking
such a transaction in the Islamic finance industry.
Ultimately, the company's concerns were sufficiently alleviated, and the
relationship it forged with the Islamic bank during this educational process was
instrumental. This alleviation came in the form of an increased investment at
close and an agreement for the possibility of additional funding by the Islamic
bank, with an agreeable exit mechanism in the event the Islamic bank elected not
to provide such additional capital.
D. LIQUIDATION PREFERENCE AND PROFIT-LOSS SHARING
Closely related to the prohibition of riba is the previously discussed legal
maxim: 'al-kharaj bi al-daman' that impacts the concept of liquidation preference
commonly found in conventional private equity transactions. A liquidation
preference grants certain shareholders a right to receive an amount equal to their
investment (or, as often the case, a multiple thereof) prior to other equity
holders upon various events such as mergers, sales of the company, dissolution,
and bankruptcy, to name a few. This preference has been prohibited under
contemporary applications of Islamic law because it is inconsistent with the
requirement that allocations or distributions of losses be in proportionate to
capital contributions, and, for some jurists, that profits be so allocated and
distributed as well." Consequently, most if not all, previous Islamic private
equity transactions have not involved a liquidation preference or conventional
preferred stock. Many conventional investors and fund managers have actually
preferred this technique since they contend it places the various shareholders on
a more equal footing and thus equally incentivizes them.
Due diligence for this transaction revealed the presence of several classes
of conventional preferred stock granting liquidation preference rights to their
respective holders. The Shari'ah committee advised that in order for the Islamic
bank to invest in the company such classes of stock simply could not be present.
To address this issue, the charter documentation of the company was amended
and restated to eliminate these various classes of preferred stock and reorganize
their holders into a single class of stock. Contractual restrictions were also put in
place controlling the company's ability to issue equity with Islamically-unlawful
features. While voting and management rights of the preferred stock holders
84
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were generally maintained, a persuasive argument was successfully made to these
shareholders as to why a sacrifice of short term gains should be made in
exchange for the significant potential created by the Islamic bank's monetary
investment and experienced participation in the company's management. This
new equity granted the existing shareholders a greater ability to participate in the
growth of the company than would have been the case had they held simple
common stock.
The absence of liquidation preference was also of concern to the Islamic
bank, primarily because this limited its ability to participate in the growth of the
company in greater amounts. The Islamic bank was far less concerned with its
ability to recoup its investment in the event of the company's poor performance.
Relying on the flexibility of Islamic law's profit-sharing rules, counsel to the
Islamic bank articulated a method matching only those certain aspects of
liquidation preference not prohibited by Islamic law. Transaction documentation
was drafted so as to create a class of equity particular to the Islamic bank and to
enable the Islamic bank to participate to a greater extent in the company's
growth. This is perhaps the most innovative feature of the subject transaction:
the structuring and documentation of a tiered waterfall schedule designed to
replicate the permissible features of liquidation preference rights such that upon
certain events, such as a merger, consolidation, or sale of the company or its
assets, distributions of the net proceeds from such events are shared by both the
existing shareholders and the Islamic investor.
With respect to the allocation and distribution of losses, contractual
documentation listed certain events upon which the company might cease to
exist and specified that on such occasions, following the payment of liabilities,
its remaining assets would be distributed to all shareholders on a pro rata basis
in accordance with their capital contributions. Predictably, the company's
various existing shareholders welcomed these provisions.
E. FIXED RETURNS
Conventional private equity transactions often contractually specify a
dividend right and contain redemption provisions that set the return as a
multiple of the invested capital. Under the legal maxim that requires profit to be
accompanied by a market or entrepreneurial risk, this method of pricing is
prohibited. This is not to say, however, that either a dividend or redemption is
per se prohibited under Islamic law. Dividends may in fact be distributed so long
as they are expressed as a percentage of revenue rather than as an absolute
amount. As a purchase price of the shares, the redemption price must be
expressed in terms of the shares' market value or some other method that does
not contractually guarantee a certain absolute amount as a return to the Islamic
investor. These pricing methods can be quite significant in alleviating concerns
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of partnering with an Islamic institution. By setting forth redemption prices and
dividend amounts in this manner, the Islamic bank demonstrates its strong
commitment to the target as a business and not merely as an investment, for the
return on its investment is directly tied to and dependent upon the failure or
success of the target's business.
The subject transaction did not involve dividends but did contain
redemption provisions as separate rights of both the Islamic investor and the
company. To avoid a contractually guaranteed or fixed return, the parties agreed
to a redemption price that was calculated with reference to the company's
market value at the time of redemption.
As noted earlier, the Islamic investor granted the company the right to
demand additional capital. In the event the investor did not provide this
additional capital, the company sought to have the investor's shares in the
company redeemed during a specified period of time in the future. The Shari'ah
committee was uncomfortable with the Islamic bank agreeing to a future sale of
its shares, arguing that the company could demand such moneys at a time when
the bank did not wish to provide it and thereby force a liquidation of the Islamic
bank's shares at a low price. Conventional private equity transactions may
address this issue by way of a redemption price articulated as a prohibitively high
multiple of the invested capital-an impermissible alternative in this case. In
addition, it may be argued that there were only two possible scenarios at the time
of demand for additional financing: (i) that the company is so profitable that the
Islamic bank wishes to increase the amount of its investment, in which case it
would readily provide the additional funds, or (ii) that the company is not
performing well, in which case the Islamic bank would prefer to liquidate its
investment anyhow.
The foregoing, however, did not fully address the Shari'ah committee's
concern, which actually centered upon a legal nuance. Specifically, the bank may
be in a situation of duress in the future and thus may not be voluntarily
consenting to the sale of its shares. Accordingly, the Shari'ah committee initially
preferred that the Islamic bank have the right to trigger this redemption-a
point to which the company of course objected. Eventually, this matter was
resolved such that the Islamic bank promised in a separate written instrument to
offer its shares for redemption, and the target retained its right to initiate this
particular redemption.
VII. CONCLUSION
Throughout the course of this private equity transaction, participants
worked towards a number of the initial goals of the Islamic finance industry. In
order to close this transaction, the Islamic investment bank and its counsel
patiently undertook a lengthy dialogue with the company and a host of other
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American persons and institutions, educating them as to the rationale and
purpose of Islamic finance. Through this process, the Islamic bank garnered
recognition for conducting business in a viable, thoughtful, and professional
manner. By closing this transaction, the Islamic bank successfully implemented,
as we have highlighted, many of Islam's legal and financial principles. And the
innovation that took place over several months in this private equity investment
succeeded in implementing some of Islam's legal and financial principles that
had perhaps not been previously implemented or at least not implemented in
such an effective manner. These novel features will, it is hoped, enable further
minority, growth equity investments that comply with Islamic precepts.
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of this transaction is that an Islamic
financial institution making a minority investment was able to convince a US
company to operate according to Islamic guidelines. This is a strong testament
to the Islamic bank-its willingness to take on the risks demanded by Islamic
principles, the relationship it forged with the company throughout the
educational dialogue, and the respect it gained for its personnel, their expertise,
and their Islamic investment method. These successes are in turn a testament to
the rationale and theoretical underpinnings of Islamic law and jurisprudence
generally and those of its principles that demand financiers to only profit when
they partner in their counterparties' risks.
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